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Abstract
This document sets out the details for extending the wage Phillips curve of the New
Area-Wide Model (NAWM; cf. Christoffel, Coenen and Warne, 2008) with a partial in-
dexation mechanism linking wages to trend productivity developments. The document
first outlines the labour-market setting in which households are offering their labour ser-
vices. It then derives the first-order condition characterising the optimal wage-setting
decision of an individual household as well as the law of motion for the aggregate wage
index. Finally, the document derives the implied log-linear wage Phillips curve. An
appendix provides additional technical details of the derivations.
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Labour-Market Setup
Consider a continuum of households indexed by h ∈ [ 0, 1 ], each of which supplies differen-
tiated labour services Nh,t and acts as wage setter in monopolistically competitive markets.
As a consequence, each household is committed to supply sufficient labour services to satisfy
labour demand.
Further, there is a continuum of firms indexed by f ∈ [ 0, 1 ], all of which take the wage
rates set by the households as given and aggregate the differentiated labour services into an
homogenous bundle using a Dixit-Stiglitz technology,
Nf,t =
(∫ 1
0
(
Nhf,t
) 1
ϕt dh
)ϕt
, (1)
where the possibly time-varying parameter ϕt > 1 is inversely related to the intratem-
poral elasticity of substitution between the differentiated labour services supplied by the
households, ηt = ϕt/(ϕt − 1) > 1.
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Under these assumptions, each household h faces the following demand for its differen-
tiated labour services from any given firm f as a function of its wage rate Wh,t relative to
the aggregate wage index Wt:
Nhf,t =
(
Wh,t
Wt
)
−
ϕt
ϕt−1
Nf,t (2)
with −ϕt/(ϕt − 1) representing the wage elasticity of labour demand.
Aggregating over the continuum of firms f , we obtain the following aggregate demand
for the labour services of a given household h:
Nht =
∫ 1
0
Nhf,t df =
(
Wh,t
Wt
)
−
ϕt
ϕt−1
Nt, (3)
which, in equilibrium, is met by the household’s commitment to supply sufficient labour
services for any wage rate set; that is,
Nh,t = N
h
t . (4)
The wage index Wt can be obtained by substituting the labour index (1) into the labour
demand schedule (2) and then integrating over the unit interval of households:
Wt =
(∫ 1
0
W
1
1−ϕt
h,t dh
)1−ϕt
. (5)
1As shown below, the parameter ϕt has a natural interpretation as a markup in the household-specific
labour market.
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The Optimal Wage-Setting Decision
Each household h supplies its differentiated labour services Nh,t in monopolistically com-
petitive markets. There is sluggish wage adjustment due to staggered wage contracts a` la
Calvo (1983). Accordingly, household h receives permission to optimally reset its nominal
wage contract Wh,t in a given period t with probability 1− ξ.
All households that receive permission to reset their wage contracts in a given period t
choose the same wage rate W˜t = W˜h,t. Those households which do not receive permission
are allowed to adjust their wage contracts according to the following scheme:
Wh,t = g
†
z,tΠ
†
C,tWh,t−1, (6)
where g†z,t = g
χ˜
z,t g
1−χ˜
z and Π
†
C,t = Π
χ
C,t−1Π¯
1−χ
t . That is, the nominal wage contracts
are indexed to a geometric average of the current (gross) rate of productivity growth,
gz,t = zt/zt−1, and the steady-state (gross) rate of productivity growth, gz, and to a ge-
ometric average of past (gross) consumer price inflation, ΠC,t−1 = PC,t−1/PC,t−2, and the
monetary authority’s possibly time-varying (gross) inflation objective, Π¯t, with χ˜ and χ
being indexation parameters.
Each household h receiving permission to reset its wage contract in period t maximises
its lifetime utility function subject to its budget constraint, the demand for its differentiated
labour services (3) and the wage-indexation scheme (6).
Hence, we obtain the following first-order condition characterising the households’ op-
timal wage-setting decision:2
Et
 ∞∑
k=0
(ξβ)k
Λt+k (1− τNt+k − τWht+k) g†z;t,t+k Π†C;t,t+kΠC;t,t+k W˜tPC,t (7)
−ϕt+k ǫ
N
t+k (Nh,t+k)
ζ
)
Nh,t+k
]
= 0,
where Λt+k denotes the marginal utility out of income (equal across all individual house-
holds in the economy), g†z;t,t+k = g
(1−χ˜)k
z
∏k
s=1 g
χ˜
z,t+s, Π
†
C;t,t+k =
∏k
s=1Π
χ
C,t+s−1Π¯
1−χ
t+s and
ΠC;t,t+k =
∏k
s=1ΠC,t+s−1.
This expression states that in those labour markets in which wage contracts are re-
optimised, the latter are set so as to equate the households’ discounted sum of expected
2See the Appendix for details.
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after-tax marginal revenues, expressed in consumption-based utility terms, λt+k, to the dis-
counted sum of expected marginal cost, expressed in terms of marginal disutility of labour,
∆h,t+k = −N
ζ
h,t+k. In the absence of wage staggering (ξ = 0), the factor ϕt represents
a possibly time-varying markup of the real after-tax wage charged over the households’
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure,
(1− τNt − τ
Wh
t )
W˜t
PC,t
= −ϕt ǫ
N
t
∆t
Λt
, (8)
reflecting the existence of monopoly power on the part of the households.3
The Aggregate Wage Index
With households setting the wage contracts for their differentiated labour services accord-
ing to equation (6) and equation (7), respectively, the aggregate wage index Wt evolves
according to
Wt =
(
ξ
(
gz,tΠ
†
C,tWt−1
) 1
1−ϕt + (1− ξ)
(
W˜t
) 1
1−ϕt
)1−ϕt
. (9)
The Log-Linear Wage Phillips Curve
We use π̂C,t = log(ΠC,t/Π¯) to denote the logarithmic deviation of the current consumer
price inflation rate from the monetary authority’s long-run inflation objective, while ̂¯πt =
log(Π¯t/Π¯) represents the logarithmic deviation of the current possibly time-varying inflation
objective from its long-run value. Moreover, because those firms which do not receive
permission to reset their prices are allowed to index them to a geometric average of past
inflation and the current inflation objective, it is natural to define the “quasi inflation gap”
̂˙πC,t = π̂C,t − π̂†t , where π̂†C,t = log(Π†C,t/Π¯) = log(ΠχC,t−1Π¯1−χt /Π¯). Similarly, we define the
“quasi productivity gap” ̂˙gz,t = ĝz,t − ĝ†z,t, where ĝ†z,t = log(g†z,t/gz) = log(gχ˜z,t/gχ˜z ).
Finally, we use ŵt, m̂rst and ϕ̂t to denote, respectively, the productivity-adjusted real
wage (deflated by the consumer price index and equal across all households), the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and leisure and the wage markup (all variables
expressed as logarithmic deviations from their respective steady-state values).
3Note that, in this case, also the marginal disutility is equal across households; that is ∆t = ∆h,t.
3
Then, combining the log-linearised first-order condition characterising the households’
optimal wage-setting decision (7) and the log-linearised aggregate wage index (5) yields the
log-linear wage Phillips curve4
ŵt =
β
1 + β
Et [ŵt+1] +
1
1 + β
ŵt−1 +
β
1 + β
Et
[̂˙πC,t+1]− 1
1 + β
̂˙πC,t (10)
+
β
1 + β
Et
[̂˙gz,t+1]− 11 + β ̂˙gz,t − (1− βξ) (1− ξ)(1 + β) ξΨ(ϕ, ζ) (ŵτt − m̂rst − ϕ̂t)
with
Ψ(ϕ, ζ) = 1 +
ϕ
ϕ− 1
ζ
and where ŵτt represents the productivity-adjusted after-tax real wage (expressed in loga-
rithmic deviation from its steady-state value) or, more compactly,
∆ ŵt = β Et [∆ ŵt+1] + β Et
[̂˙πC,t+1]− ̂˙πC,t (11)
+β Et
[̂˙gz,t+1]− ̂˙gz,t − (1− βξ) (1 − ξ)ξΨ(ϕ, ζ) (ŵτt − m̂rst − ϕ̂t) ,
which shows that it relates changes in the productivity-adjusted real wage to current and
future deviations of the productivity-adjusted after-tax real wage from the markup over the
marginal rate of substitution, accounting for developments in inflation and productivity.
Alternatively, noting that ̂˙πC,t = π̂C,t − π̂†C,t = π̂C,t − χ π̂C,t−1 − (1 − χ) ̂¯πt and ̂˙gz,t =
ĝz,t− ĝ
†
z,t = (1− χ˜) ĝz,t, the wage Phillips curve can be written in terms of the productivity-
adjusted (after-tax) real wage, actual consumer price inflation, the inflation objective and
productivity developments as
ŵt =
β
1 + β
Et [ŵt+1] +
1
1 + β
ŵt−1 +
β
1 + β
Et [π̂C,t+1] (12)
−
1 + βχ
1 + β
π̂C,t +
χ
1 + β
π̂C,t−1 −
β(1− χ)
1 + β
Et
[̂¯πC,t+1]+ 1− χ
1 + β
̂¯πC,t
+
β(1− χ˜)
1 + β
Et [ĝz,t+1]−
1− χ˜
1 + β
ĝz,t −
(1− βξ) (1 − ξ)
(1 + β) ξΨ(ϕ, ζ)
(ŵτt − m̂rst − ϕ̂t) .
Appendix
In this appendix, we provide details on the derivation of the first-order condition charac-
terising the households’ optimal wage-setting decision (7). We then log-linearise the latter
4For details see the Appendix.
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as well as the aggregate wage index (9) around the deterministic steady state. We finally
derive the log-linear wage Phillips curve (A.15).
The Optimal Wage-Setting Decision
To derive the first-order condition characterising the households’ optimal wage-setting de-
cision, we form the associated Lagrangean, substituting the labour demand schedule (3),
the market-clearing condition (4), and the wage-indexation scheme (6), while neglecting all
terms that are not relevant for the optimisation,
Et
 ∞∑
k=0
(ξβ)k
(
−
ǫNt+k
1 + ζ
((
g†z;t,t+k Π
†
C;t,t+k
Wh,t
Wt+k
)
−
ϕt+k
ϕt+k−1
Nt+k
)1+ζ
(A.1)
+Λt+k (1− τ
N
t+k − τ
Wh
t+k) g
†
z;t,t+k Π
†
C;t,t+k
Wh,t
PC,t+k
(
g†z;t,t+k Π
†
C;t,t+k
Wh,t
Wt+k
)
−
ϕt+k
ϕt+k−1
Nt+k
)
or, more compactly,
Et
[
∞∑
k=0
(ξβ)k
(
Λt+k (1− τ
N
t+k − τ
Wh
t+k)
Wt+k
PC,t+k
(
g†z;t,t+k Π
†
C;t,t+k
Wh,t
Wt+k
)
−
1
ϕt+k−1
Nt+k (A.2)
−
ǫNt+k
1 + ζ
((
g†z;t,t+k Π
†
C;t,t+k
Wh,t
Wt+k
)
−
ϕt+k
ϕt+k−1
Nt+k
)1+ζ ,
where Λt+k denotes the marginal utility out of income (equal across all households),
g†z;t,t+k = g
(1−χ˜)k
z
∏k
s=1 g
χ˜
z,t+s, and Π
†
C;t,t+k =
∏k
s=1Π
χ
C,t+s−1Π¯
1−χ
t+s .
Differentiating this expression with respect to Wh,t then yields, after some algebra, the
first-order condition characterising the households’ optimal wage-setting decision,
Et
 ∞∑
k=0
(ξβ)k
Λt+k (1− τNt+k − τWht+k) g†z;t,t+k Π†C;t,t+kΠC;t,t+k W˜tPC,t (A.3)
−ϕt+k ǫ
N
t+k
((
g†z;t,t+k Π
†
C;t,t+k
W˜t
Wt+k
)
−
ϕt+k
ϕt+k−1
Nt+k
)ζ
×
(
g†z;t,t+k Π
†
C;t,t+k
W˜t
Wt+k
)
−
ϕt+k
ϕt+k−1
Nt+k
 = 0,
where W˜t denotes the optimal wage rate in period t that is chosen by all households that
have received permission to reset their wage contracts and ΠC;t,t+k =
∏k
s=1ΠC,t+s−1.
Invoking again the demand schedule (3) in combination with the market-clearing con-
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dition (4) and the indexation scheme (6), the first-order condition (A.3) simplifies to
Et
 ∞∑
k=0
(ξβ)k
Λt+k (1− τNt+k − τWht+k) g†z;t,t+k Π†C;t,t+kΠC;t,t+k W˜tPC,t (A.4)
−ϕt+k ǫ
N
t+k (Nh,t+k)
ζ
)
Nh,t+k
]
= 0,
(cf. equation (7) in the main text).
Log-Linearisation of the Optimal Wage-Setting Decision
In order to log-linearise the households’ optimal wage-setting decision, it is convenient to
define the auxiliary variables xt = W˜t/Wt, wt = Wt/(ztPC,t) and λt = zt Λt. Substituting
these variables, the first-order condition (A.3) can be re-written as
Et
 ∞∑
k=0
(ξβ)k
λt+k (1− τNt+k − τWht+k)wt+k
g†z;t,t+k
gz;t,t+k
Π†C;t,t+k
ΠC;t,t+k
xt
wt
wt+k
− 1ϕt+k−1 Nt+k (A.5)
−ϕt+k ǫ
N
t+k

g†z;t,t+k
gz;t,t+k
Π†C;t,t+k
ΠC;t,t+k
xt
wt
wt+k
−
ϕt+k
ϕt+k−1
Nt+k

1+ζ
 = 0,
or, after re-arranging,
Et
 ∞∑
k=0
(ξβ)k λt+k (1− τ
N
t+k − τ
Wh
t+k)wt+k
g†z;t,t+k
gz;t,t+k
Π†C;t,t+k
ΠC;t,t+k
xt
wt
wt+k
− 1ϕt+k−1 Nt+k
 (A.6)
= Et
 ∞∑
k=0
(ξβ)k ϕt+k ǫ
N
t+k

g†z;t,t+k
gz;t,t+k
Π†C;t,t+k
ΠC;t,t+k
xt
wt
wt+k
−
ϕt+k
ϕt+k−1
Nt+k

1+ζ
where gz;t,t+k =
∏k
s=1 gz,t+s−1.
Indicating the logarithmic deviation of a variable from its steady-state value by a
hat (‘̂’), defining steady-state values implicitly by dropping the time subscripts, and noting
that Π†C = Π, x = ǫ
N = 1, we obtain the following log-linearised expression:
Et
[
∞∑
k=0
(βξ)k λ (1− τN − τWh)wN
(
λ̂t+k −
τ̂N + τ̂Wh
1− τN − τWh
+ ŵt+k (A.7)
−
1
ϕ− 1
(
k∑
s=1
(
π̂†C,t+s − π̂C,t+s + ĝ
†
z,t+s − ĝz,t+s
)
+ x̂t + ŵt − ŵt+k
)
+ N̂t+k
)]
= Et
[
∞∑
k=0
(βξ)k ϕN1+ζ
(
ϕ̂t+k + ǫ̂
N
t+k −
(1 + ζ)ϕ
ϕ− 1
(
k∑
s=1
(
π̂†C,t+s − π̂C,t+s
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+ ĝ†z,t+s − ĝz,t+s
)
+ x̂t + ŵt − ŵt+k
)
+ (1 + ζ) N̂t+k
)]
or, noting that (1 − τN − τWh)w = ϕN ζ/λ (cf. equation (8) in the main text) and re-
arranging,
Et
[
∞∑
k=0
(βξ)k
(
ŵτt+k − m̂rst+k − ϕ̂t+k (A.8)
+Ψ(ϕ, ζ)
(
k∑
s=1
(
π̂†C,t+s − π̂C,t+s + ĝ
†
z,t+s − ĝz,t+s
)
+ x̂t + ŵt − ŵt+k
))]
= 0,
where the terms
ŵτt+k = −
τ̂N + τ̂Wh
1− τN − τWh
+ ŵt+k,
m̂rst+k = ǫ̂
N
t+k + ζ N̂t+k − λ̂t+k
denote the log-linearised productivity-adjusted after-tax real wage and the log-linearised
marginal rate of substitution, respectively, and
Ψ(ϕ, ζ) = 1 +
ϕ
ϕ− 1
ζ.
Solving for x̂t + ŵt, we obtain
x̂t + ŵt = − (1− βξ) Et
[
∞∑
k=0
(βξ)k
(
Ψ(ϕ, ζ)−1
(
ŵτt+k − m̂rst+k − ϕ̂t+k
)
(A.9)
−
k∑
s=1
(
π̂C,t+s − π̂
†
C,t+s + ĝ
†
z,t+s − ĝz,t+s
)
− ŵt+k
)]
= − (1− βξ) Et
[
∞∑
k=0
(βξ)k
(
Ψ(ϕ, ζ)−1
(
ŵτt+k − m̂rst+k − ϕ̂t+k
)
− ŵt+k
) ]
+(1− βξ)Et
[
∞∑
k=0
(βξ)k
k−1∑
s=0
(
π̂C,t+s+1 − π̂
†
C,t+s+1 + ĝ
†
z,t+s − ĝz,t+s
) ]
= − (1− βξ) Et
[
∞∑
k=0
(βξ)k
(
Ψ(ϕ, ζ)−1
(
ŵτt+k − m̂rst+k − ϕ̂t+k
)
− ŵt+k
) ]
+βξ Et
[
∞∑
k=0
(βξ)k
(
π̂C,t+k+1 − π̂
†
C,t+k+1 + ĝ
†
z,t+s − ĝz,t+s
) ]
.
Forming the quasi-difference Zt − βξ Et[Zt+1] then yields
x̂t + ŵt − βξ Et [x̂t+1 + ŵt+1] = − (1− βξ)Ψ(ϕ, ζ)
−1 (ŵτt − m̂rst − ϕ̂t) (A.10)
+ (1− βξ) ŵt + βξ Et
[̂˙πC,t+1]+ βξ Et [̂˙gz,t+1] ,
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where ̂˙πC,t = π̂C,t − π̂†C,t and ̂˙gz,t = ĝz,t − ĝ†z,t.
Log-Linearisation of the Aggregate Wage Index
To log-linearise the aggregate wage index (9), we first re-write the identity as
1 =
ξ
g†z,t
gz,t
Π†C,t
ΠC,t
wt−1
wt
 11−ϕt + (1− ξ) (xt) 11−ϕt

1−ϕt
. (A.11)
Log-linearisation then yields
x̂t =
ξ
1− ξ
(
ŵt − ŵt−1 + ̂˙πC,t + ̂˙gz,t) . (A.12)
The Log-Linear Wage Phillips Curve
Combining equations (A.10) and (A.12) yields the log-linear wage Phillips-curve
ŵt =
β
1 + β
Et [ŵt+1] +
1
1 + β
ŵt−1 +
β
1 + β
Et
[̂˙πC,t+1]− 1
1 + β
̂˙πC,t (A.13)
+
β
1 + β
Et
[̂˙gz,t+1]− 11 + β ̂˙gz,t − (1− βξ) (1 − ξ)(1 + β) ξΨ(ϕ, ζ) (ŵτt − m̂rst − ϕ̂t) ,
or, more compactly,
∆ ŵt = β Et [∆ ŵt+1] + β Et
[̂˙πC,t+1]− ̂˙πC,t (A.14)
+β Et
[̂˙gz,t+1]− ̂˙gz,t − (1− βξ) (1 − ξ)ξΨ(ϕ, ζ) (ŵτt − m̂rst − ϕ̂t) ,
Alternatively, recalling that ̂˙πC,t = π̂C,t − π̂†C,t = π̂C,t − χ π̂C,t−1 − (1− χ) ̂¯πt and ̂˙gz,t =
ĝz,t− ĝ
†
z,t = (1− χ˜) ĝz,t, the wage Phillips curve can be written in terms of the productivity-
adjusted (after-tax) real wage, actual consumer price inflation, the inflation objective and
productivity developments as
ŵt =
β
1 + β
Et [ŵt+1] +
1
1 + β
ŵt−1 +
β
1 + β
Et [π̂C,t+1] (A.15)
−
1 + βχ
1 + β
π̂C,t +
χ
1 + β
π̂C,t−1 −
β(1 − χ)
1 + β
Et
[̂¯πC,t+1]+ 1− χ
1 + β
̂¯πC,t
+
β(1 − χ˜)
1 + β
Et [ĝz,t+1]−
1− χ˜
1 + β
ĝz,t −
(1− βξ) (1 − ξ)
(1 + β) ξΨ(ϕ, ζ)
(ŵτt − m̂rst − ϕ̂t)
(cf. equation (A.15) in the main text).
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